blitzstrike (shinthink/blitzstrike) is an MCP server listed on the M8ven Trust Index. It scores 66 out of 100, grade C. It declares 97 tools. No publisher has claimed this listing.
⚡ Blitz Strike — a universal MCP penetration-testing toolbelt. Structured methodology: reconnaissance & attack-surface mapping, source-to-sink analysis, and live validation. 57 escalation chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.
Caution. Specific findings reduced this grade. They are listed on the page. Grades reflect the full trust pyramid: code, verification depth, and reputation. New projects cap at C until adoption is earned.
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The grade above is for the source repository. Registries can serve a different version, so we mark the ones we were not able to read.
These names and descriptions are the publisher's own, read from the source code. We print them as written. Our assessment is the findings above, not this list.
blitz_scanBLITZ: scan a source tree for unauth entry points + dangerous sinks with file:line refs.
blitz_fileBLITZ: scan a single source file for entry points + sinks.
eagle_eyeEAGLE-EYE: return a function's full body, sinks in scope, and auth gates in scope.
eagle_grepEAGLE-EYE: report a sink ONLY inside a function body, flagged guarded/un-guarded (anti-grep-monkey).
enrich_scanScan a source tree AND match detected sinks to escalation chains (chains.json).
strike_verifystrike_resolveSTRIKE+FINDINGS: take a canonical Finding and a STRIKE verdict, and advance the lifecycle end-to-end — hypothesis->validating->confirmed (marker reflected, control inert) or ->false_positive/blocked/unconfirmed. Returns the updated finding with evidence + recomputed confidence.
scan_leaked_sourceEAGLE-EYE: scan ARBITRARY leaked text (a 500 traceback, a debug page, a source dump, a config file, an error message, a credential dump) for dangerous sinks — eval/exec/os.system (RCE), render_template_string (SSTI), SQL string-building, requests.get (SSRF), file read (LFI), SECRET_KEY/API keys, har…
crack_hashCREDENTIAL: when you dump password hashes, EXECUTE this instead of leaving 'crack the hashes' as a recommendation. Identifies the hash type (bcrypt/md5/sha1/sha256/sha512/ntlm) and immediately tries a built-in common-password list offline, then returns the exact hashcat/john command for the full cra…
scope_checkSTRIKE: classify a target against scope (intel for the report — not a gate). Exclusion-aware, mode-aware.
active_scanSTRIKE: live black-box scan of a URL — fingerprint, WAF detection, tech correlation, endpoint discovery. No authorization gate (the repo disclaimer covers responsibility).
live_reconrun_engagementSTRIKE: the DEFAULT first call when the user asks to test / scan / audit / engagement / pentest a URL or source path. Runs the whole audit in ONE call (no babysitting): source path -> triage -> chain enrichment -> findings -> inline report (markdown+JSON+SARIF); URL -> full autonomous live pipeline …
run_autonomousORCHESTRATION: like run_engagement but the escalation path is pre-attached to every finding (chain name/severity/prerequisites + ordered next_steps with action + tool_hint + success_criteria + negative_control). Use when the user asks to test / scan / audit a target and you want the 'what to do next…
blitz_statusFormat a terminal-friendly live progress snapshot of the running engagement — current stage (of the scope→recon→analyze→verify→review→report pipeline), finding counts, and task status. Call it to announce progress to the user as you drive the audit.
list_chainsSTRIKE: list all escalation chains in the data layer (chains.json).
fofa_searchSTRIKE: search the FOFA asset index (needs FOFA_EMAIL + FOFA_KEY).
nvd_lookupSTRIKE: look up a CVE from NVD 2.0 (no key required).
tool_lookupLook up a tool in tools-catalog.json (command + flags + install + check).
list_toolsList all tools in the catalog, grouped by category.
skill_lookupSearch the skills/ knowledge base for a relevant playbook by topic.
list_skillsList all skill playbooks in the knowledge base.
read_skillRead the full content of a skill playbook by name.
ensure_toolCheck if a catalog tool is installed; if not, install it (auto-install).
rememberSave a reusable insight to long-term memory (deduped). verified=true only if marker reflected + negative control inert.
memory_lookupSearch memory by topic/tag/content, scored by relevance.
memory_listList all memory entries, grouped by type.
memory_forgetMEMORY: remove a memory entry by id (append-only store; 'forget' = tombstone).
read_tool_manualRead the full deep reference manual for a security tool (317 manuals from kali-pentest, Apache-2.0).
list_manualsList all tool manuals and playbooks available.
read_playbookRead a full engagement playbook (web-app, api-security, active-directory, forensics-triage, etc.).
list_playbooksList all engagement playbooks available.
detect_wafINTEL: detect a WAF from HTTP response headers/body (100+ signatures).
tech_correlationINTEL: given a technology, return known vulns + CVEs + paths.
cve_correlationINTEL: given a CVE, return product + affected targets + severity.
port_correlationINTEL: given a port, return service + attack vectors (103 ports).
fuzzer_payloadsINTEL: fuzzing payload collections + vulnerable patterns + chain rules.
intel_summaryINTEL: counts of WAF sigs, tech/CVE/port correlations, fuzzer categories, and attack vectors.
list_attack_vectorsBLITZ: list the full web attack-vector taxonomy (34 categories, 588 vectors) grouped by category, for attack-surface mapping.
attack_vectorsBLITZ: return the full vector list for one attack category (e.g. 'ssrf', 'business logic', 'ai/llm') so a driving agent covers the whole attack surface.
attack_planDECISION: return the prioritized attack-vector plan for a target — the vectors to test (injection vectors always listed, then param/tech hints add + reprioritize), each with a reason and the specific tool. Call this AFTER run_engagement recon to decide what to test next with data instead of guessing…
payload_lookupINTEL: find a payload collection (66 categories from PayloadsAllTheThings).
bypass_lookupINTEL: return bypass techniques for a defense that is blocking a probe. Pass a defense/context (waf, firewall, filter, sanitizer, blacklist, 403/401, auth, captcha, rate limit) and get concrete techniques (encoding, case, comment insertion, chunked, null byte, double-encoding, verb tampering, header…
chain_linksINTEL: return how escalation chains compose — which chain naturally follows another (e.g. SSRF->cloud-metadata then default-creds->internal-pivot via stolen IAM). Use it after confirming a chain to see what a complex bug chains into next, instead of stopping at one chain.
retry_guidanceINTEL: return structured recovery actions for a failure mode instead of giving up. Pass a signal (empty output, blocked, sanitized, subagent failed, model failed/rate-limit, unconfirmed, low severity) and get concrete next actions (reload-mcp, escalate detector, bypass_lookup, challenge sanitizer, r…
orchestrationINTEL: return the orchestration framework — the engagement lifecycle (scope→recon→analyze→deep→verify→report, each with entry/exit criteria), the sub-agent team (roles + tools + returns), the handoff contract, and the termination criteria. Load this at engagement start; pass a phase/role id (scope, …
model_fallbackORCHESTRATION: classify a model or sub-agent failure and decide the recovery. Pass the error text (rate limit / 429 / quota / context length / timeout / 500 / auth / connection / unavailable / aborted) and get the error class, whether it is retryable, whether to back off, the per-class action (retry…
doctrine_mapORCHESTRATION: return the interconnected doctrine map — each phase (scope→recon→analyze→deep→verify→report) with its skill, OWASP WSTG category, tools, and data; plus the cross-cutting moments (blocked→bypass_lookup, finding→list_chains/chain_links, probe→payload_lookup, failed→model_fallback/retry_…
wstg_mapINTEL: map an OWASP WSTG category (WSTG-INFO, WSTG-INPV, WSTG-BUSL, WSTG-CLNT, WSTG-APIT, ...) to the Blitz Strike skill, phase, tools, and data that covers it, including the high-value advanced tests where Blitz has a specific deterministic capability. Use to ground the engagement in the official f…
technique_lookupINTEL: return the DETAILED methodology + tricks for one vulnerability class (52 classes: ssrf, request smuggling, cache poisoning, race conditions, ssti, deserialization, prototype pollution, mass assignment, sql/nosql injection, xss, cors, csrf, jwt, oauth, host header, open redirect, subdomain tak…
framework_tricksINTEL: return framework-specific exploitation knowledge for a framework (Laravel, Django, Flask, Node/Express, Next.js, Vue, Angular, WordPress, Joomla, Spring, JSP, Python, Go, Ruby/Rails, Perl, GraphQL) — detection signals, known vulns/CVEs, and concrete attack tricks. Use after detect_framework t…
resource_lookupINTEL: return the FULL curated security resource index (78 entries, 44 domains — every entry from the community Awesome-Hacking meta-list: web, api, pentest, recon, payload, cve, privesc, source, fuzzing, llm, framework, osint, rev, cracking, forensics, malware, ir, intel, cicd, devsecops, defense, …
taxonomyINTEL: return standard taxonomy for grounding + professional reporting. taxonomy(web) = OWASP Top 10 (2021); taxonomy(api) = OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023); taxonomy(cwe, query) = CWE ID for a technique class; taxonomy(asvs) = ASVS verification chapters. Each maps to Blitz Strike coverage. Use to …
engagement_startORCHESTRATION: open an engagement and track its state. Call at the start of a full audit so subsequent engagement_phase / engagement_track / engagement_status calls have a state to update. The LLM is the brain; this is the deterministic bookkeeping hand.
engagement_phaseORCHESTRATION: move the engagement to the next lifecycle phase (scope, recon, analyze, deep, verify, report). The phase tracks where the audit is; engagement_status uses it for the termination check.
engagement_trackORCHESTRATION: record a hypothesis (a candidate finding keyed by its sink) with its status — pending, confirmed, or rejected. engagement_status derives the termination check from these; an untracked hypothesis is one the LLM has to remember, which is exactly what this avoids.
engagement_statusORCHESTRATION: return the current engagement state — phase, hypotheses, counts — and a deterministic termination check (done or the exact unmet criteria). Call this instead of asking yourself 'am I done?'. Also drives blitz_status-style progress.
planORCHESTRATION: generate the deterministic engagement plan (phase order, tool per phase, evidence required, risk, permission) for a target + mode. This is the planning pass (like a planning sub-agent) — call ONCE at the start, then execute without re-planning.
delegateORCHESTRATION: decompose a workstream list into parallel-first dispatch batches (named dependencies only) + the retry pattern. Fire every batch in ONE message; sequential is the exception. Returns batches so the LLM dispatches without re-deriving the dependency graph.
task_startORCHESTRATION: register a delegated workstream with an ordered plan (steps). Every step records a checkpoint so a failed workstream can be RESUMED from its last completed step instead of restarting. On-disk, so checkpoints survive restarts.
task_checkpointORCHESTRATION: record a checkpoint for a task step (in_progress / done / failed / blocked) with an optional note + output hash. Advancing 'done' moves current_step forward; a 'failed' checkpoint marks the task for resume.
task_statusORCHESTRATION: read a task's current state — status, current step, progress (done/total), remaining steps, and full checkpoint history. The orchestrator's deterministic view of where each workstream is.
task_resumeORCHESTRATION: compute the resume instruction for a failed/blocked task — the last completed checkpoint, the current step, the remaining steps, and the exact re-dispatch prompt (resume from where it stopped, not a fresh start).
worktreeORCHESTRATION: create/list/remove an isolated git worktree so parallel workstreams don't conflict on the same files. add: `git worktree add -b <branch> <path>`; list: enumerate existing; remove: clean up after a workstream.
watchdogORCHESTRATION: detect a stalled phase — no progress (idle > 15 min, no hypotheses). Returns STALLED / PROGRESSING / IDLE plus the concrete intervention so the LLM unblocks instead of looping.
context_pruneORCHESTRATION: produce a compact summary (phase, confirmed/pending/rejected counts, top findings) so the LLM can DROP raw detail from its context and keep only this. The engagement tracker is the source of truth — re-read it instead of relying on memory.
read_payloadINTEL: read the full payload collection for a category (or a specific file).
template_lookupINTEL: find nuclei YAML templates matching a CVE/tech/topic (11.9k templates).
finding_createFINDINGS: create a canonical, evidence-first finding. Severity describes impact; confidence (deterministic) describes certainty. Default status=detected (hypothesis-pending).
finding_transitionFINDINGS: advance a finding through its strict lifecycle (detected->triaged->hypothesis->validating->confirmed). Rejects illegal transitions.
confidence_scoreFINDINGS: compute a deterministic weighted confidence score (static/data-flow/reachability/preconditions/validation/negative-control). Never an AI opinion.
confidence_weightsFINDINGS: inspect or override the deterministic confidence weights (configurable per the framework spec). Pass `set` (JSON object of weight overrides) to change them; omit to read the current weights.
finding_attach_evidenceFINDINGS: attach a redacted, SHA-256-tagged evidence record to an existing canonical finding (without advancing its lifecycle).
redactEVIDENCE: redact passwords/API keys/tokens/cookies/private keys from text before persisting evidence or reporting.
trace_data_flowEAGLE-EYE: trace data flow in a file — classify sources, sinks, sanitizers, and authorization gates. Returns candidates (reachable+unsanitized), sanitized (not findings), and authorized (lower priority).
variant_analysisEAGLE-EYE: variant analysis — group data-flow candidates by root cause (sink category + source), deduplicating identical patterns across files.
taint_scanEAGLE-EYE: real taint tracking — variable assignment, cross-function flow, and sanitizer awareness. Finds tainted data reaching sinks even across function boundaries.
eagle_eye2EAGLE-EYE 2.0: whole-program data-flow on a PHP AST — call-graph-aware interprocedural taint with return propagation, by-reference alias tracking, ternary/conditional merge, context-sensitive sanitizers, and authorization-gate detection. Prefer this over taint_scan for accurate cross-function reacha…
route_scanRoute confusion (separate class from source→sink taint): detect attacker-controlled dispatch (call_user_func/forward/dispatch), dynamic method calls ($obj->$m()), dynamic include (LFI), batch/proxy forwarding without per-route auth re-check, and route matching without path normalization.
complex_scanComplex-bug detection beyond taint: deserialization→POP gadget chain (unserialize + magic method), type juggling (loose ==/!= vs hash/secret), mass assignment (extract/parse_str without a safe flag), prototype pollution (unsafe merge of request data), CRLF/header injection (user input into a header)…
diff_analyzePHASE 4: compare two versions of code (files or a git commit range) and surface only security-sensitive changes — new vulnerabilities, fixed vulnerabilities, new sinks/sources, removed sanitizers, and removed authorization gates.
incremental_scanEAGLE-EYE: analyze only the files changed between two git refs (default HEAD~1..HEAD) — the fast CI pass. Runs the taint + data-flow engine on just the changed source files and skips unchanged ones; the full-scan path (run_engagement / enrich_scan) remains authoritative.
list_frameworksPHASE 5: list the web frameworks Blitz Strike understands for framework-aware security analysis (Laravel, WordPress, Express, Next.js, Django, FastAPI, Spring).
detect_frameworkPHASE 5: detect the web framework used by a source file (reads the file, then scores each framework's detection signals for the file's language).
framework_intelPHASE 5: return a framework's security knowledge (sources, sinks, sanitizers, auth gates, routing, ORM, middleware) and optionally scan code with those patterns.
browser_validatePHASE 6: validate a static-analysis HYPOTHESIS by driving a real headless Chromium. Checks: dom_xss, open_redirect, auth_bypass, csrf. Use only when necessary — to confirm a hypothesis with browser evidence, not as a first-pass scan. Requires playwright-core (optional peer dependency).
browser_agentPHASE 12: drive a real headless-Chromium session. Ops: open, navigate, click, type, evaluate, screenshot, back, forward, get_cookie, set_cookie, plus detect_auth_form, diagnostics, close. Enables multi-step flows (login/MFA) and DOM issue detection. Requires playwright-core (optional peer dependency…
taint_treeEAGLE-EYE: run inter-procedural taint analysis across an entire source tree.
list_languagestaint_filecvss_scoreCVSS: compute a deterministic CVSS v3.1 base score + vector + severity from metric values (AV/AC/PR/UI/S/C/I/A). Self-computed, not read from NVD.
dedup_findingsFINDINGS: collapse a list of findings that share a root cause (sink type + source type + CWE) into one group per root cause.
generate_reportREPORT: emit a deterministic markdown (or JSON) report from canonical Findings, with summary + integrity hash. Reproducible: same findings -> byte-identical output.
run_benchmarkBENCHMARK: run the labelled corpus and report detection rate, false-positive rate, and precision. The quality metric, not the tool count.
coverage_matrixBENCHMARK: enumerate language × sink-class coverage (which languages detect which sink types), plus the coverage ratio.
run_enterprise_benchmarkBENCHMARK: run the deterministic detectors (taint + route-confusion + complex-bugs) against realistic framework fixtures (Laravel/Express/Django/Spring + batch-route + complex-bugs) and report per-fixture recall.
check_updateUPDATE: query the npm registry for the latest blitzstrike version. Tells a driving agent whether the package or the data cache is stale.
Disclosed vulnerabilities in this server's declared npm dependencies (via OSV). Whether each is reachable depends on the installed versions.
Anthropic's MCP TypeScript SDK has a ReDoS vulnerability
Model Context Protocol (MCP) TypeScript SDK does not enable DNS rebinding protection by default
BLITZSTRIKE_DATABLITZSTRIKE_HOME). run_engagement auto-captures matched escalation chainsFOFA_EMAILFOFA asset index search (needs FOFA_EMAIL + FOFA_KEY).FOFA_KEYFOFA asset index search (needs FOFA_EMAIL + FOFA_KEY).DATABASE_URLTool annotations
No tools have read-only/destructive annotations
Add readOnlyHint or destructiveHint annotations to every tool so hosts can warn users before invoking.
All four hints declared on every tool
97/97 tools missing one or more hints — blitz_scan (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); blitz_file (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); eagle_eye (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint), +94 more. OpenAI's directory rejects tools where any of the four hints are missing or non-boolean.
For every tool, set all four hints (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint) to explicit true/false values that match the handler’s actual behaviour.
Tool inputs are validated
96/97 tool handlers declare input schemas (99%)
Declare an inputSchema with zod/joi/yup on every tool definition.
Tool test coverage
Only 14/97 tools referenced in tests (14%)
Write tests that reference each tool by name so every tool has at least one test.
No eval / new Function
1 eval() or new Function() call — dynamic code execution
Replace eval / Function with explicit parsing or safer alternatives.
Shell command execution
11 calls in production code run through a shell (src/catalog.ts:188, src/catalog.ts:199, src/cli.ts:27)
Prefer library functions over shell-outs. If you must shell out, ensure all inputs are properly escaped.
Production dependencies are patched
0 critical, 2 high severity in production deps — @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.6.0 (high), @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.6.0 (high)
Run npm audit fix, or upgrade the affected packages to a non-vulnerable version.
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