blitzstrike (shinthink/blitzstrike) is an MCP server listed on the M8ven Trust Index. It scores 66 out of 100, grade C. It declares 97 tools. No publisher has claimed this listing.

C
Caution
66/100

blitzstrike

⚡ Blitz Strike — a universal MCP penetration-testing toolbelt. Structured methodology: reconnaissance & attack-surface mapping, source-to-sink analysis, and live validation. 57 escalation chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.

Caution. Specific findings reduced this grade. They are listed on the page. Grades reflect the full trust pyramid: code, verification depth, and reputation. New projects cap at C until adoption is earned.

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Who stands behind it

shinthink

Source: github_repo_search

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Install from

The grade above is for the source repository. Registries can serve a different version, so we mark the ones we were not able to read.

// key findings
⚠️
Known vulnerabilities in dependencies: 2 high
Affects packages this MCP installs at runtime. Upgrade or remove the affected dependency.
No credential exfiltration, no sensitive file access, no obfuscation
Static analysis found nothing flowing your secrets to unexpected places.
Open source with a license and README
Anyone can audit the code, the license is declared, and the publisher documents what it does.
🔐
You'll be asked for 1 credential: FOFA_KEY
These are read from process.env at runtime. Make sure you trust where they’ll be sent.
// tools this server exposes97 tools

These names and descriptions are the publisher's own, read from the source code. We print them as written. Our assessment is the findings above, not this list.

blitz_scan

BLITZ: scan a source tree for unauth entry points + dangerous sinks with file:line refs.

blitz_file

BLITZ: scan a single source file for entry points + sinks.

eagle_eye

EAGLE-EYE: return a function's full body, sinks in scope, and auth gates in scope.

eagle_grep

EAGLE-EYE: report a sink ONLY inside a function body, flagged guarded/un-guarded (anti-grep-monkey).

enrich_scan

Scan a source tree AND match detected sinks to escalation chains (chains.json).

strike_verify
strike_resolve

STRIKE+FINDINGS: take a canonical Finding and a STRIKE verdict, and advance the lifecycle end-to-end — hypothesis->validating->confirmed (marker reflected, control inert) or ->false_positive/blocked/unconfirmed. Returns the updated finding with evidence + recomputed confidence.

scan_leaked_source

EAGLE-EYE: scan ARBITRARY leaked text (a 500 traceback, a debug page, a source dump, a config file, an error message, a credential dump) for dangerous sinks — eval/exec/os.system (RCE), render_template_string (SSTI), SQL string-building, requests.get (SSRF), file read (LFI), SECRET_KEY/API keys, har

crack_hash

CREDENTIAL: when you dump password hashes, EXECUTE this instead of leaving 'crack the hashes' as a recommendation. Identifies the hash type (bcrypt/md5/sha1/sha256/sha512/ntlm) and immediately tries a built-in common-password list offline, then returns the exact hashcat/john command for the full cra

scope_check

STRIKE: classify a target against scope (intel for the report — not a gate). Exclusion-aware, mode-aware.

active_scan

STRIKE: live black-box scan of a URL — fingerprint, WAF detection, tech correlation, endpoint discovery. No authorization gate (the repo disclaimer covers responsibility).

live_recon
run_engagement

STRIKE: the DEFAULT first call when the user asks to test / scan / audit / engagement / pentest a URL or source path. Runs the whole audit in ONE call (no babysitting): source path -> triage -> chain enrichment -> findings -> inline report (markdown+JSON+SARIF); URL -> full autonomous live pipeline

run_autonomous

ORCHESTRATION: like run_engagement but the escalation path is pre-attached to every finding (chain name/severity/prerequisites + ordered next_steps with action + tool_hint + success_criteria + negative_control). Use when the user asks to test / scan / audit a target and you want the 'what to do next

blitz_status

Format a terminal-friendly live progress snapshot of the running engagement — current stage (of the scope→recon→analyze→verify→review→report pipeline), finding counts, and task status. Call it to announce progress to the user as you drive the audit.

list_chains

STRIKE: list all escalation chains in the data layer (chains.json).

fofa_search

STRIKE: search the FOFA asset index (needs FOFA_EMAIL + FOFA_KEY).

nvd_lookup

STRIKE: look up a CVE from NVD 2.0 (no key required).

tool_lookup

Look up a tool in tools-catalog.json (command + flags + install + check).

list_tools

List all tools in the catalog, grouped by category.

skill_lookup

Search the skills/ knowledge base for a relevant playbook by topic.

list_skills

List all skill playbooks in the knowledge base.

read_skill

Read the full content of a skill playbook by name.

ensure_tool

Check if a catalog tool is installed; if not, install it (auto-install).

remember

Save a reusable insight to long-term memory (deduped). verified=true only if marker reflected + negative control inert.

memory_lookup

Search memory by topic/tag/content, scored by relevance.

memory_list

List all memory entries, grouped by type.

memory_forget

MEMORY: remove a memory entry by id (append-only store; 'forget' = tombstone).

read_tool_manual

Read the full deep reference manual for a security tool (317 manuals from kali-pentest, Apache-2.0).

list_manuals

List all tool manuals and playbooks available.

read_playbook

Read a full engagement playbook (web-app, api-security, active-directory, forensics-triage, etc.).

list_playbooks

List all engagement playbooks available.

detect_waf

INTEL: detect a WAF from HTTP response headers/body (100+ signatures).

tech_correlation

INTEL: given a technology, return known vulns + CVEs + paths.

cve_correlation

INTEL: given a CVE, return product + affected targets + severity.

port_correlation

INTEL: given a port, return service + attack vectors (103 ports).

fuzzer_payloads

INTEL: fuzzing payload collections + vulnerable patterns + chain rules.

intel_summary

INTEL: counts of WAF sigs, tech/CVE/port correlations, fuzzer categories, and attack vectors.

list_attack_vectors

BLITZ: list the full web attack-vector taxonomy (34 categories, 588 vectors) grouped by category, for attack-surface mapping.

attack_vectors

BLITZ: return the full vector list for one attack category (e.g. 'ssrf', 'business logic', 'ai/llm') so a driving agent covers the whole attack surface.

attack_plan

DECISION: return the prioritized attack-vector plan for a target — the vectors to test (injection vectors always listed, then param/tech hints add + reprioritize), each with a reason and the specific tool. Call this AFTER run_engagement recon to decide what to test next with data instead of guessing

payload_lookup

INTEL: find a payload collection (66 categories from PayloadsAllTheThings).

bypass_lookup

INTEL: return bypass techniques for a defense that is blocking a probe. Pass a defense/context (waf, firewall, filter, sanitizer, blacklist, 403/401, auth, captcha, rate limit) and get concrete techniques (encoding, case, comment insertion, chunked, null byte, double-encoding, verb tampering, header

chain_links

INTEL: return how escalation chains compose — which chain naturally follows another (e.g. SSRF->cloud-metadata then default-creds->internal-pivot via stolen IAM). Use it after confirming a chain to see what a complex bug chains into next, instead of stopping at one chain.

retry_guidance

INTEL: return structured recovery actions for a failure mode instead of giving up. Pass a signal (empty output, blocked, sanitized, subagent failed, model failed/rate-limit, unconfirmed, low severity) and get concrete next actions (reload-mcp, escalate detector, bypass_lookup, challenge sanitizer, r

orchestration

INTEL: return the orchestration framework — the engagement lifecycle (scope→recon→analyze→deep→verify→report, each with entry/exit criteria), the sub-agent team (roles + tools + returns), the handoff contract, and the termination criteria. Load this at engagement start; pass a phase/role id (scope,

model_fallback

ORCHESTRATION: classify a model or sub-agent failure and decide the recovery. Pass the error text (rate limit / 429 / quota / context length / timeout / 500 / auth / connection / unavailable / aborted) and get the error class, whether it is retryable, whether to back off, the per-class action (retry

doctrine_map

ORCHESTRATION: return the interconnected doctrine map — each phase (scope→recon→analyze→deep→verify→report) with its skill, OWASP WSTG category, tools, and data; plus the cross-cutting moments (blocked→bypass_lookup, finding→list_chains/chain_links, probe→payload_lookup, failed→model_fallback/retry_

wstg_map

INTEL: map an OWASP WSTG category (WSTG-INFO, WSTG-INPV, WSTG-BUSL, WSTG-CLNT, WSTG-APIT, ...) to the Blitz Strike skill, phase, tools, and data that covers it, including the high-value advanced tests where Blitz has a specific deterministic capability. Use to ground the engagement in the official f

technique_lookup

INTEL: return the DETAILED methodology + tricks for one vulnerability class (52 classes: ssrf, request smuggling, cache poisoning, race conditions, ssti, deserialization, prototype pollution, mass assignment, sql/nosql injection, xss, cors, csrf, jwt, oauth, host header, open redirect, subdomain tak

framework_tricks

INTEL: return framework-specific exploitation knowledge for a framework (Laravel, Django, Flask, Node/Express, Next.js, Vue, Angular, WordPress, Joomla, Spring, JSP, Python, Go, Ruby/Rails, Perl, GraphQL) — detection signals, known vulns/CVEs, and concrete attack tricks. Use after detect_framework t

resource_lookup

INTEL: return the FULL curated security resource index (78 entries, 44 domains — every entry from the community Awesome-Hacking meta-list: web, api, pentest, recon, payload, cve, privesc, source, fuzzing, llm, framework, osint, rev, cracking, forensics, malware, ir, intel, cicd, devsecops, defense,

taxonomy

INTEL: return standard taxonomy for grounding + professional reporting. taxonomy(web) = OWASP Top 10 (2021); taxonomy(api) = OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023); taxonomy(cwe, query) = CWE ID for a technique class; taxonomy(asvs) = ASVS verification chapters. Each maps to Blitz Strike coverage. Use to

engagement_start

ORCHESTRATION: open an engagement and track its state. Call at the start of a full audit so subsequent engagement_phase / engagement_track / engagement_status calls have a state to update. The LLM is the brain; this is the deterministic bookkeeping hand.

engagement_phase

ORCHESTRATION: move the engagement to the next lifecycle phase (scope, recon, analyze, deep, verify, report). The phase tracks where the audit is; engagement_status uses it for the termination check.

engagement_track

ORCHESTRATION: record a hypothesis (a candidate finding keyed by its sink) with its status — pending, confirmed, or rejected. engagement_status derives the termination check from these; an untracked hypothesis is one the LLM has to remember, which is exactly what this avoids.

engagement_status

ORCHESTRATION: return the current engagement state — phase, hypotheses, counts — and a deterministic termination check (done or the exact unmet criteria). Call this instead of asking yourself 'am I done?'. Also drives blitz_status-style progress.

plan

ORCHESTRATION: generate the deterministic engagement plan (phase order, tool per phase, evidence required, risk, permission) for a target + mode. This is the planning pass (like a planning sub-agent) — call ONCE at the start, then execute without re-planning.

delegate

ORCHESTRATION: decompose a workstream list into parallel-first dispatch batches (named dependencies only) + the retry pattern. Fire every batch in ONE message; sequential is the exception. Returns batches so the LLM dispatches without re-deriving the dependency graph.

task_start

ORCHESTRATION: register a delegated workstream with an ordered plan (steps). Every step records a checkpoint so a failed workstream can be RESUMED from its last completed step instead of restarting. On-disk, so checkpoints survive restarts.

task_checkpoint

ORCHESTRATION: record a checkpoint for a task step (in_progress / done / failed / blocked) with an optional note + output hash. Advancing 'done' moves current_step forward; a 'failed' checkpoint marks the task for resume.

task_status

ORCHESTRATION: read a task's current state — status, current step, progress (done/total), remaining steps, and full checkpoint history. The orchestrator's deterministic view of where each workstream is.

task_resume

ORCHESTRATION: compute the resume instruction for a failed/blocked task — the last completed checkpoint, the current step, the remaining steps, and the exact re-dispatch prompt (resume from where it stopped, not a fresh start).

worktree

ORCHESTRATION: create/list/remove an isolated git worktree so parallel workstreams don't conflict on the same files. add: `git worktree add -b <branch> <path>`; list: enumerate existing; remove: clean up after a workstream.

watchdog

ORCHESTRATION: detect a stalled phase — no progress (idle > 15 min, no hypotheses). Returns STALLED / PROGRESSING / IDLE plus the concrete intervention so the LLM unblocks instead of looping.

context_prune

ORCHESTRATION: produce a compact summary (phase, confirmed/pending/rejected counts, top findings) so the LLM can DROP raw detail from its context and keep only this. The engagement tracker is the source of truth — re-read it instead of relying on memory.

read_payload

INTEL: read the full payload collection for a category (or a specific file).

template_lookup

INTEL: find nuclei YAML templates matching a CVE/tech/topic (11.9k templates).

finding_create

FINDINGS: create a canonical, evidence-first finding. Severity describes impact; confidence (deterministic) describes certainty. Default status=detected (hypothesis-pending).

finding_transition

FINDINGS: advance a finding through its strict lifecycle (detected->triaged->hypothesis->validating->confirmed). Rejects illegal transitions.

confidence_score

FINDINGS: compute a deterministic weighted confidence score (static/data-flow/reachability/preconditions/validation/negative-control). Never an AI opinion.

confidence_weights

FINDINGS: inspect or override the deterministic confidence weights (configurable per the framework spec). Pass `set` (JSON object of weight overrides) to change them; omit to read the current weights.

finding_attach_evidence

FINDINGS: attach a redacted, SHA-256-tagged evidence record to an existing canonical finding (without advancing its lifecycle).

redact

EVIDENCE: redact passwords/API keys/tokens/cookies/private keys from text before persisting evidence or reporting.

trace_data_flow

EAGLE-EYE: trace data flow in a file — classify sources, sinks, sanitizers, and authorization gates. Returns candidates (reachable+unsanitized), sanitized (not findings), and authorized (lower priority).

variant_analysis

EAGLE-EYE: variant analysis — group data-flow candidates by root cause (sink category + source), deduplicating identical patterns across files.

taint_scan

EAGLE-EYE: real taint tracking — variable assignment, cross-function flow, and sanitizer awareness. Finds tainted data reaching sinks even across function boundaries.

eagle_eye2

EAGLE-EYE 2.0: whole-program data-flow on a PHP AST — call-graph-aware interprocedural taint with return propagation, by-reference alias tracking, ternary/conditional merge, context-sensitive sanitizers, and authorization-gate detection. Prefer this over taint_scan for accurate cross-function reacha

route_scan

Route confusion (separate class from source→sink taint): detect attacker-controlled dispatch (call_user_func/forward/dispatch), dynamic method calls ($obj->$m()), dynamic include (LFI), batch/proxy forwarding without per-route auth re-check, and route matching without path normalization.

complex_scan

Complex-bug detection beyond taint: deserialization→POP gadget chain (unserialize + magic method), type juggling (loose ==/!= vs hash/secret), mass assignment (extract/parse_str without a safe flag), prototype pollution (unsafe merge of request data), CRLF/header injection (user input into a header)

diff_analyze

PHASE 4: compare two versions of code (files or a git commit range) and surface only security-sensitive changes — new vulnerabilities, fixed vulnerabilities, new sinks/sources, removed sanitizers, and removed authorization gates.

incremental_scan

EAGLE-EYE: analyze only the files changed between two git refs (default HEAD~1..HEAD) — the fast CI pass. Runs the taint + data-flow engine on just the changed source files and skips unchanged ones; the full-scan path (run_engagement / enrich_scan) remains authoritative.

list_frameworks

PHASE 5: list the web frameworks Blitz Strike understands for framework-aware security analysis (Laravel, WordPress, Express, Next.js, Django, FastAPI, Spring).

detect_framework

PHASE 5: detect the web framework used by a source file (reads the file, then scores each framework's detection signals for the file's language).

framework_intel

PHASE 5: return a framework's security knowledge (sources, sinks, sanitizers, auth gates, routing, ORM, middleware) and optionally scan code with those patterns.

browser_validate

PHASE 6: validate a static-analysis HYPOTHESIS by driving a real headless Chromium. Checks: dom_xss, open_redirect, auth_bypass, csrf. Use only when necessary — to confirm a hypothesis with browser evidence, not as a first-pass scan. Requires playwright-core (optional peer dependency).

browser_agent

PHASE 12: drive a real headless-Chromium session. Ops: open, navigate, click, type, evaluate, screenshot, back, forward, get_cookie, set_cookie, plus detect_auth_form, diagnostics, close. Enables multi-step flows (login/MFA) and DOM issue detection. Requires playwright-core (optional peer dependency

taint_tree

EAGLE-EYE: run inter-procedural taint analysis across an entire source tree.

list_languages
taint_file
cvss_score

CVSS: compute a deterministic CVSS v3.1 base score + vector + severity from metric values (AV/AC/PR/UI/S/C/I/A). Self-computed, not read from NVD.

dedup_findings

FINDINGS: collapse a list of findings that share a root cause (sink type + source type + CWE) into one group per root cause.

generate_report

REPORT: emit a deterministic markdown (or JSON) report from canonical Findings, with summary + integrity hash. Reproducible: same findings -> byte-identical output.

run_benchmark

BENCHMARK: run the labelled corpus and report detection rate, false-positive rate, and precision. The quality metric, not the tool count.

coverage_matrix

BENCHMARK: enumerate language × sink-class coverage (which languages detect which sink types), plus the coverage ratio.

run_enterprise_benchmark

BENCHMARK: run the deterministic detectors (taint + route-confusion + complex-bugs) against realistic framework fixtures (Laravel/Express/Django/Spring + batch-route + complex-bugs) and report per-fixture recall.

check_update

UPDATE: query the npm registry for the latest blitzstrike version. Tells a driving agent whether the package or the data cache is stale.

// known CVEs in dependencies2 high

Disclosed vulnerabilities in this server's declared npm dependencies (via OSV). Whether each is reachable depends on the installed versions.

high@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.6.0GHSA-8r9q-7v3j-jr4g

Anthropic's MCP TypeScript SDK has a ReDoS vulnerability

high@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.6.0GHSA-w48q-cv73-mx4w

Model Context Protocol (MCP) TypeScript SDK does not enable DNS rebinding protection by default

Depend on this server? Get alerted when its CVEs change.Watch this server free →
// environment variables
To run this server yourself, you supply these values. They go in your own MCP client configuration and stay on your machine. The secret label means the value is sensitive, not that the server mishandles it.
configBLITZSTRIKE_DATA
configBLITZSTRIKE_HOME). run_engagement auto-captures matched escalation chains
configFOFA_EMAILFOFA asset index search (needs FOFA_EMAIL + FOFA_KEY).
🔐 secretFOFA_KEYFOFA asset index search (needs FOFA_EMAIL + FOFA_KEY).
Deployment configuration, supplied by whoever hosts the server. Users are not asked for these.
deployDATABASE_URL
// quality suggestions

Tool annotations

No tools have read-only/destructive annotations

Add readOnlyHint or destructiveHint annotations to every tool so hosts can warn users before invoking.

All four hints declared on every tool

97/97 tools missing one or more hints — blitz_scan (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); blitz_file (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); eagle_eye (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint), +94 more. OpenAI's directory rejects tools where any of the four hints are missing or non-boolean.

For every tool, set all four hints (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint) to explicit true/false values that match the handler’s actual behaviour.

Tool inputs are validated

96/97 tool handlers declare input schemas (99%)

Declare an inputSchema with zod/joi/yup on every tool definition.

Tool test coverage

Only 14/97 tools referenced in tests (14%)

Write tests that reference each tool by name so every tool has at least one test.

No eval / new Function

1 eval() or new Function() call — dynamic code execution

Replace eval / Function with explicit parsing or safer alternatives.

Shell command execution

11 calls in production code run through a shell (src/catalog.ts:188, src/catalog.ts:199, src/cli.ts:27)

Prefer library functions over shell-outs. If you must shell out, ensure all inputs are properly escaped.

Production dependencies are patched

0 critical, 2 high severity in production deps — @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.6.0 (high), @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.6.0 (high)

Run npm audit fix, or upgrade the affected packages to a non-vulnerable version.

Claim the listing to review these findings one by one and send us a correction where you disagree, straight to the team. Claiming also means we tell you when the grade moves, and reach you first if we find anything urgent.

// full audit trail
The findings above are the summary. The full trail, every check we ran, each deduction, the network hosts observed and the dependency advisories, goes to verified publishers, along with an alert whenever a new one lands. Verified publishers can also review each finding and dispute it in one click. Publisher corrections have sharpened several of our checks this month, because the maintainer knows the codebase better than any scanner.
// improvement guidance — verified publishers only
We have 7 concrete improvements we can share with the publisher of this MCP. Each comes with specific guidance to raise the trust score.
// embed badge in your README
[![M8ven Verified](https://m8ven.ai/badge/mcp/shinthink/blitzstrike?variant=verified)](https://m8ven.ai/mcp/shinthink/blitzstrike)
Shows verification status without the grade. Want the grade badge instead? Remove ?variant=verified from the URL.
commit: 0cfdf179da621fc36c3c3e6d698227e6c7bc4f2c
code hash: 74e540bb9a4eceab6059fc1db4669579f6724e06faa3f63d2cf9a7f1dffff5cd
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