swiftsign-mcp (shahdadk/swiftsign) is an MCP server listed on the M8ven Trust Index. It scores 29 out of 100, grade F. It declares 11 tools. No publisher has claimed this listing.

Warning

29/100

swiftsign-mcp

Item: swiftsign-mcp
Rating: 29
Author: M8ven

E-signature for AI agents. One unauthenticated call returns a sandbox API key (no account, no browser), then the agent can send documents for signature, check status, and download the sealed PDF plus Certificate of Completion.

→ shahdadk/swiftsign · listed on glama

Warning. Serious findings were identified. Review the full report before connecting. Grades reflect the full trust pyramid: code, verification depth, and reputation. New projects cap at C until adoption is earned.

How we verified

⚡ Live Monitored: not connected

Verified is a snapshot. Live keeps it current, and builds your track record.

⚡ Connect GitHub → continuous verification on every push why connect →

Who stands behind it

shahdadk

Source: Glama

Is this your MCP?

Claim it to get a verified publisher badge, a free copy of our full audit findings, and direct contact for any high-priority issues we find. Or connect your repo for our deepest verification, Live Monitored: read-only, revoke anytime. What we access →

⚡ Connect GitHub for Live Monitored

Install from

Glamanot scored here

The grade above is for the source repository. Registries can serve a different version, so we mark the ones we were not able to read.

// key findings

🚨

Secret credentials may flow to a network call

12 flows detected: SWIFTSIGN_API_KEY. We can’t prove the destination matches the brand the credential belongs to.

⚠️

Tool annotations don’t match behaviour

1 read-only tool performs write/delete/exec — swiftsign_download_signed_pdf (line 441: writeFile(target, buffer))

⚠️

Known vulnerabilities in dependencies: 8 high

Affects packages this MCP installs at runtime. Upgrade or remove the affected dependency.

🔐

You'll be asked for 3 credentials: DOCUSIGN_INTEGRATION_KEY, SWIFTSIGN_API_KEY, SWIFTSIGN_SEED_API_KEY

These are read from process.env at runtime. Make sure you trust where they’ll be sent.

// tools this server exposes11 tools

These names and descriptions are the publisher's own, read from the source code. We print them as written. Our assessment is the findings above, not this list.

swiftsign_signup

Create a sandbox SwiftSign account and get a test API key (no browser needed). Returns an sk_test_ key for sandbox sends — upgrade with swiftsign_upgrade for live. Set the returned key as SWIFTSIGN_API_KEY to use the other tools.

swiftsign_send_envelope

Send a document for e-signature. Accepts PDF as base64, recipients, and field placement. Sandbox keys (sk_test_) send immediately (watermarked test mail). LIVE keys create a DRAFT and return it for human review unless confirm: true — nothing is emailed until confirmed. Field placement: page+x+y (per…

swiftsign_confirm_send

Dispatch a DRAFT envelope — use after a human has reviewed an envelope that swiftsign_send_envelope or swiftsign_send_from_template returned as draft_pending_confirmation. This emails the signers. Does NOT work on envelopes already SENT/COMPLETED/VOIDED.

swiftsign_send_from_template

Send an envelope from a saved template by assigning signers to roles. Sandbox keys (sk_test_) send immediately; LIVE keys create a DRAFT for human review unless confirm: true — nothing is emailed until confirmed.

swiftsign_check_status

Check the status of an envelope — who signed, who hasn't, download links. Works in both sandbox (sk_test_ keys) and live.

swiftsign_list_envelopes

List envelopes (sent documents) with their status. Scoped to your key's mode — sandbox (sk_test_) keys see test envelopes, live keys see live.

swiftsign_void_envelope

Cancel/void an envelope that hasn't been completed yet. Signers can no longer sign a voided envelope. Works in both sandbox (sk_test_ keys) and live.

swiftsign_download_signed_pdf

Download the completed, sealed PDF (or its Certificate of Completion) for an envelope. Only works once status is COMPLETED — run swiftsign_check_status first. Does NOT work on DRAFT or SENT envelopes; nothing has been signed yet on those.

swiftsign_upgrade

Initiate the upgrade to PRO ($15/mo flat). Returns a Stripe checkout_url that a human opens once to add a card — agents cannot complete the payment themselves. Moves the account from sandbox (sk_test_) to live sends. Returns status 'updated' if already on the plan.

swiftsign_create_embedded_url

Mint a short-lived embedded signing URL for a recipient (30-minute expiry). Returns a url to embed plus its expiresAt. The envelope must already be SENT. Works in both sandbox (sk_test_ keys) and live.

swiftsign_list_templates

List your saved templates. Scoped to your key's mode — sandbox (sk_test_) keys see test templates, live keys see live.

// known CVEs in dependencies8 high7 low

Disclosed vulnerabilities in this server's declared npm dependencies (via OSV). Whether each is reachable depends on the installed versions.

highnext@16.2.1GHSA-267c-6grr-h53f

Next.js has a Middleware / Proxy bypass in App Router applications via segment-prefetch routes

highnext@16.2.1GHSA-26hh-7cqf-hhc6

Next.js has a Middleware / Proxy bypass in App Router applications via segment-prefetch routes - Incomplete Fix Follow-Up

highnext@16.2.1GHSA-36qx-fr4f-26g5

Next.js has a Middleware / Proxy bypass in Pages Router applications using i18n

highnext@16.2.1GHSA-492v-c6pp-mqqv

Next.js has a Middleware / Proxy bypass through dynamic route parameter injection

highnext@16.2.1GHSA-8h8q-6873-q5fj

Next.js Vulnerable to Denial of Service with Server Components

Depend on this server? Get alerted when its CVEs change.Watch this server free →

// environment variables

To run this server yourself, you supply these values. They go in your own MCP client configuration and stay on your machine. The secret label means the value is sensitive, not that the server mishandles it.

🔐 secretDOCUSIGN_INTEGRATION_KEY

configDOCUSIGN_REDIRECT_PORT

configSKIP_ENV_VALIDATION

🔐 secretSWIFTSIGN_API_KEYConfigure with (and optionally SWIFTSIGN_API_URL for self-hosted instances).

configSWIFTSIGN_API_URLConfigure with SWIFTSIGN_API_KEY (and optionally for self-hosted instances).

🔐 secretSWIFTSIGN_SEED_API_KEY

configSWIFTSIGN_URL

configUX_TEST_API_URL

Deployment configuration, supplied by whoever hosts the server. Users are not asked for these.

deployDATABASE_URL

deployNEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_DSN

deploySENTRY_DSN

// quality suggestions

All four hints declared on every tool

11/11 tools missing one or more hints — swiftsign_signup (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint); swiftsign_send_envelope (missing: readOnlyHint, idempotentHint); swiftsign_confirm_send (missing: readOnlyHint, idempotentHint), +8 more. OpenAI's directory rejects tools where any of the four hints are missing or non-boolean.

For every tool, set all four hints (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint) to explicit true/false values that match the handler’s actual behaviour.

Tool annotations match behaviour

1 read-only tool performs write/delete/exec — swiftsign_download_signed_pdf (line 441: writeFile(target, buffer))

Either remove the readOnlyHint:true annotation, or remove the write/delete call from the tool handler.

Tool inputs are validated

9/11 tool handlers declare input schemas (82%)

Declare an inputSchema with zod/joi/yup on every tool definition.

License file

No license file

Add a LICENSE file (MIT, Apache-2.0, etc.).

Tool test coverage

Only 0/11 tools referenced in tests (0%)

Write tests that reference each tool by name so every tool has at least one test.

No arbitrary install scripts

Has postinstall/preinstall script — runs arbitrary code on npm install

Remove postinstall/preinstall hooks unless they’re essential.

Production dependencies are patched

0 critical, 8 high severity in production deps — next@16.2.1 (high), next@16.2.1 (high)

Run npm audit fix, or upgrade the affected packages to a non-vulnerable version.

Dependency freshness

1/39 production deps stale: pdf-lib@2022-05-12 (4.1y)

Claim the listing to review these findings one by one and send us a correction where you disagree, straight to the team. Claiming also means we tell you when the grade moves, and reach you first if we find anything urgent.

// full audit trail

The findings above are the summary. The full trail, every check we ran, each deduction, the network hosts observed and the dependency advisories, goes to verified publishers, along with an alert whenever a new one lands. Verified publishers can also review each finding and dispute it in one click. Publisher corrections have sharpened several of our checks this month, because the maintainer knows the codebase better than any scanner.

// improvement guidance — verified publishers only

We have 7 concrete improvements we can share with the publisher of this MCP. Each comes with specific guidance to raise the trust score.

// embed badge in your README

[![M8ven Verified](https://m8ven.ai/badge/mcp/shahdadk/swiftsign?variant=verified)](https://m8ven.ai/mcp/shahdadk/swiftsign)

Shows verification status without the grade. Want the grade badge instead? Remove ?variant=verified from the URL.

commit: 766f73e3a0e8705f8ca0816eb07aad22c004be17

code hash: c42c46625c64b38c07f80aa0cc4b99241e798329c2ed6e169886455c3f65a910

view raw JSON →

Check MCPs from inside your assistant

Tool Check · MCP

Vetting this one by hand? Tool Check is an MCP that scores other MCPs. Add it once and ask Claude, ChatGPT, or any MCP client to grade a server, surface CVEs, check the publisher, and suggest safer alternatives — before you install.

https://m8ven.ai/api/mcp/tool-check

check_toolsearch_toolscompare_toolsrecommend_alternativescheck_publisherreport_concern

How to add it →Free · no account needed · works in any MCP client