etrade-mcp (sblattj/etrade-mcp) is an MCP server listed on the M8ven Trust Index. It scores 54 out of 100, grade D. It declares 11 tools. No publisher has claimed this listing.

D
Caution
54/100

etrade-mcp

MCP server for E*TRADE that reads account balances, positions, transactions, and orders, with optional opt-in order placement via a two-step preview-confirm handshake.

Caution. Specific findings reduced this grade. They are listed on the page. Grades reflect the full trust pyramid: code, verification depth, and reputation. New projects cap at C until adoption is earned.

How we verified

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Who stands behind it

sblattj

Source: Glama

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Install from

The grade above is for the source repository. Registries can serve a different version, so we mark the ones we were not able to read.

// key findings
⚠️
Known vulnerabilities in dependencies: 3 high
Affects packages this MCP installs at runtime. Upgrade or remove the affected dependency.
No credential exfiltration, no sensitive file access, no obfuscation
Static analysis found nothing flowing your secrets to unexpected places.
Open source with a license and README
Anyone can audit the code, the license is declared, and the publisher documents what it does.
🔐
You'll be asked for 2 credentials: ETRADE_LOGIN_PASSWORD, ETRADE_TOTP_SECRET
These are read from process.env at runtime. Make sure you trust where they’ll be sent.
// tools this server exposes11 tools

These names and descriptions are the publisher's own, read from the source code. We print them as written. Our assessment is the findings above, not this list.

etrade_cancel_order

Cancel an open E*TRADE order by orderId. Requires confirm:true. An order already routed to or filled at market cannot be cancelled.

etrade_get_balance

Get cash balance, buying power, and NAV for an E*TRADE account.

etrade_get_portfolio

Get current positions for an E*TRADE account.

etrade_get_transaction

Get detail for a specific E*TRADE transaction.

etrade_list_accounts

List all E*TRADE accounts for the authenticated user.

etrade_list_orders

List orders for an E*TRADE account (read-only). Use status=OPEN to see working orders or status=EXECUTED to confirm a fill before placing a paired stop.

etrade_list_transactions

List transactions for an E*TRADE account in a date range.

etrade_place_order

STEP 2 — SENDS THE ORDER TO MARKET (real money in PROD). Accepts ONLY a previewId from a recent etrade_preview_order plus confirm:true. It replays the exact order that was previewed, so you can never place something that was not previewed and shown to the user first.

etrade_preview_order

STEP 1 of placing an E*TRADE order. Validates the order and returns E*TRADE's own cost/commission estimate plus a previewId. Nothing is sent to market. Show the preview to the user, then call etrade_place_order with that previewId and confirm:true within 3 minutes to execute.

etrade_preview_spread
etrade_snapshot

Fan-out snapshot of all E*TRADE accounts: balances + positions (+ optional recent transactions).

// known CVEs in dependencies3 high

Disclosed vulnerabilities in this server's declared npm dependencies (via OSV). Whether each is reachable depends on the installed versions.

high@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.11GHSA-345p-7cg4-v4c7

@modelcontextprotocol/sdk has cross-client data leak via shared server/transport instance reuse

high@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.11GHSA-8r9q-7v3j-jr4g

Anthropic's MCP TypeScript SDK has a ReDoS vulnerability

high@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.11GHSA-w48q-cv73-mx4w

Model Context Protocol (MCP) TypeScript SDK does not enable DNS rebinding protection by default

Depend on this server? Get alerted when its CVEs change.Watch this server free →
// environment variables
To run this server yourself, you supply these values. They go in your own MCP client configuration and stay on your machine. The secret label means the value is sensitive, not that the server mishandles it.
configCDP_PORT(, default 9333), filling the username and password fields with trusted input events. It
🔐 secretETRADE_LOGIN_PASSWORDETRADE_LOGIN_USERNAME / ) drives a
configETRADE_LOGIN_USERNAME/ ETRADE_LOGIN_PASSWORD) drives a
🔐 secretETRADE_TOTP_SECRETvipaccess CLI's provision command) you get a base32 secret. Store it as and
configETRADE_VERIFIERargument, or ) completes it later.
// quality suggestions

Tool annotations

No tools have read-only/destructive annotations

Add readOnlyHint or destructiveHint annotations to every tool so hosts can warn users before invoking.

All four hints declared on every tool

11/11 tools missing one or more hints — etrade_cancel_order (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); etrade_get_balance (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); etrade_get_portfolio (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint), +8 more. OpenAI's directory rejects tools where any of the four hints are missing or non-boolean.

For every tool, set all four hints (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint) to explicit true/false values that match the handler’s actual behaviour.

Tool inputs are validated

Only 0/11 tool handlers declare input schemas (0%)

Declare an inputSchema with zod/joi/yup on every tool definition.

Tool test coverage

5/11 tools referenced in tests (45%)

Write tests that reference each tool by name so every tool has at least one test.

Shell command execution

1 child_process call — runs shell commands

Prefer library functions over shell-outs. If you must shell out, ensure all inputs are properly escaped.

Production dependencies are patched

0 critical, 3 high severity in production deps — @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.11 (high), @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.11 (high)

Run npm audit fix, or upgrade the affected packages to a non-vulnerable version.

Dependency freshness

1/4 production deps stale: oauth-1.0a@2022-06-22 (4.1y)

Claim the listing to review these findings one by one and send us a correction where you disagree, straight to the team. Claiming also means we tell you when the grade moves, and reach you first if we find anything urgent.

// full audit trail
The findings above are the summary. The full trail, every check we ran, each deduction, the network hosts observed and the dependency advisories, goes to verified publishers, along with an alert whenever a new one lands. Verified publishers can also review each finding and dispute it in one click. Publisher corrections have sharpened several of our checks this month, because the maintainer knows the codebase better than any scanner.
// improvement guidance — verified publishers only
We have 6 concrete improvements we can share with the publisher of this MCP. Each comes with specific guidance to raise the trust score.
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commit: d91ee6749bf04f99a7c3f3d00ad4f0b628c66376
code hash: 8c28bdb1627ee9b7838e499b138137bea873c13a48c6bb90a24b2499dcafc4f9
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