tg-mcp-guarded (matskevich/tg-mcp-guarded) is an MCP server listed on the M8ven Trust Index. It scores 69 out of 100, grade C. It declares 44 tools. No publisher has claimed this listing.

C
Limited view
69/100

tg-mcp-guarded

Dual-plane Telegram MCP server providing read-only analytics and guarded write actions with built-in rate limiting, anti-spam protection, and session management.

Limited view. Automated analysis covers part of this stack. Findings reflect what we verified. Grades reflect the full trust pyramid: code, verification depth, and reputation. New projects cap at C until adoption is earned.

Limited view: static analysis for Python is partially covered.

How we verified

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Who stands behind it

matskevich

Source: Glama

Is this your MCP?

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Install from

The grade above is for the source repository. Registries can serve a different version, so we mark the ones we were not able to read.

// key findings
No credential exfiltration, no sensitive file access, no obfuscation
Static analysis found nothing flowing your secrets to unexpected places.
Open source with a license and README
Anyone can audit the code, the license is declared, and the publisher documents what it does.
// environment variables
To run this server yourself, you supply these values. They go in your own MCP client configuration and stay on your machine. The secret label means the value is sensitive, not that the server mishandles it.
configTG_MCP_SERVER_NAME
configTG_ALLOW_SESSION_SWITCH
configTG_ACTIONS_ENABLED
configTG_ACTIONS_REQUIRE_ALLOWLIST
configTG_ACTIONS_UNSAFE_OVERRIDEActionMCP is fail-closed by default: weakening core safe flags auto-disables actions unless =1.
configTG_ACTIONS_MAX_MESSAGE_LEN"": "2000",
configTG_ACTIONS_MAX_FILE_MB
configTG_ACTIONS_MIN_CONFIRM_TEXT_LEN
configTG_ACTIONS_IDEMPOTENCY_WINDOW_SEC"": "86400",
configTG_ACTIONS_REQUIRE_CONFIRMATION_TEXT
configTG_ACTIONS_CONFIRMATION_PHRASENon-dry-run write actions require confirm=true and exact confirmation_text ().
configTG_ACTIONS_REQUIRE_APPROVAL_CODENon-dry-run write actions also require one-time approval_code from the matching dry_run preview (=1).
configTG_ACTIONS_IDEMPOTENCY_ENABLED
configTG_ACTIONS_APPROVAL_TTL_SEC"": "1800",
configTG_ACTIONS_APPROVAL_MIN_AGE_SECapproval_code has minimum age (, default 30s): immediate execute right after dry_run is blocked.
configTG_ACTIONS_APPROVAL_FILE"": "data/anti_spam/action_approvals.json",
configTG_ACTIONS_BATCH_TTL_HOURS"": "168",
configTG_ACTIONS_BATCH_APPROVAL_LEASE_SEC"": "86400",
configTG_ACTIONS_BATCH_RUN_LEASE_SEC"": "1800",
configTG_ACTIONS_BATCH_FILE"": "data/anti_spam/action_batches.json",
configTG_ACTIONS_ALLOWED_GROUPSenv ="-1001234567890" \
configTG_WRITE_CONTEXTenv =read_mcp \
configTG_ENFORCE_ACTION_PROCESSIn strict mode (=1), write is allowed only when process entrypoint is mcp_server_actions.py.
configTG_EXPECTED_USERNAMEenv ="my_main_account" \
configTG_SESSION_CONFLICT_REGISTRY_FILEenv ="$REPO/data/anti_spam/session_registry.json" \
configTG_READ_SESSION_PATHenv ="$REPO/data/sessions/my_account_ro.session" \
configTG_ACTIONS_SESSION_PATHenv ="$REPO/data/sessions/my_account.session" \
configTG_SESSIONS_DIRenv ="$REPO/data/sessions" \
configTG_SESSION_PATH_CONFLICT_MODEenv =warn \
configTG_SESSION_PATHenv ="$REPO/data/sessions/my_account_ro.session" \
configSESSION_NAME
configTG_DISABLE_RATE_LIMIT_FOR_TESTS
configPYTEST_CURRENT_TEST
configRATE_RPS
configMAX_DM_PER_DAY
configMAX_JOINS_PER_DAY
configMAX_GROUP_MSGS_PER_DAY
configMAX_GROUPS
configTG_GLOBAL_RPS_MODEenv =shared \
configTG_FLOOD_CIRCUIT_THRESHOLD_SEC"": "300",
configTG_FLOOD_CIRCUIT_COOLDOWN_SEC"": "900",
configSESSION_DIR
configTG_SESSION_LOCK_MODEenv =shared \
configTG_RECEIVE_UPDATES0 (default) disables Telethon updates loop to reduce sqlite session lock contention.
configTG_BLOCK_DIRECT_TELETHON_WRITE
configTG_ALLOW_DIRECT_TELETHON_WRITE
configTG_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP
configTG_ACTION_PROCESS
configTG_DIRECT_TELETHON_WRITE_ALLOWED_CONTEXTSenv =actions_mcp \
configTG_SESSION_RUNTIME_MODEenv =copy \
configTG_SESSION_RUNTIME_PROFILE
configTG_SECRET_PROVIDERenv (default): read plain env values
configTG_USE_KEYCHAIN
configTG_API_IDEdit .env with your , TG_API_HASH
configTG_API_HASHEdit .env with your TG_API_ID,
configTG_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE
configTG_KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT_API_ID
configTG_KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT_API_HASHTG_API_HASH
// quality suggestions

Tool annotations

No tools have read-only/destructive annotations

Add readOnlyHint or destructiveHint annotations to every tool so hosts can warn users before invoking.

All four hints declared on every tool

44/44 tools missing one or more hints — tg_create_private_group (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); tg_list_sessions (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); tg_use_session (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint), +41 more. OpenAI's directory rejects tools where any of the four hints are missing or non-boolean.

For every tool, set all four hints (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint) to explicit true/false values that match the handler’s actual behaviour.

Tool inputs are validated

37/44 tool handlers declare input schemas (84%)

Declare an inputSchema with zod/joi/yup on every tool definition.

Tool handlers catch errors

Only 10/44 tool handlers wrap calls in try/catch (23%)

Wrap each tool handler body in try/catch and return a structured error response.

Tests exist

No test files found

Add tests that exercise each declared tool.

Claim the listing to review these findings one by one and send us a correction where you disagree, straight to the team. Claiming also means we tell you when the grade moves, and reach you first if we find anything urgent.

// full audit trail
The findings above are the summary. The full trail, every check we ran, each deduction, the network hosts observed and the dependency advisories, goes to verified publishers, along with an alert whenever a new one lands. Verified publishers can also review each finding and dispute it in one click. Publisher corrections have sharpened several of our checks this month, because the maintainer knows the codebase better than any scanner.
// improvement guidance — verified publishers only
We have 5 concrete improvements we can share with the publisher of this MCP. Each comes with specific guidance to raise the trust score.
// embed badge in your README
[![M8ven Score](https://m8ven.ai/badge/mcp/matskevich/tg-mcp-guarded)](https://m8ven.ai/mcp/matskevich/tg-mcp-guarded)
Shows your grade and updates automatically. Prefer no grade? Append ?variant=verified to the badge URL.
commit: 1f6788fc8f0e95bb73313f866eef613b8c0f6ca8
code hash: 4633ae867f7d848d411eafaafa7d0a388ea00bcf9b75053073ddff27fc506167
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