F
Warning
6/100
6 days ago

todoMCP

A Model Context Protocol service for Claude that enables natural language interaction with Microsoft Todo tasks, including viewing task lists, creating tasks, and managing checklist items.

Warning. Serious findings were identified. Review the full report before connecting. Grades reflect the full trust pyramid: code, verification depth, and reputation. New projects cap at C until adoption is earned.

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Who stands behind it

jhirono

Source: modelscope · also listed on github_code

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// key findings
🚨
Secret credentials may flow to a network call
1 flow detected: CLIENT_SECRET. We can’t prove the destination matches the brand the credential belongs to.
⚠️
Tool descriptions don’t match what handlers do
3 tools describe read intent but their handlers mutate — get-task-lists (line 64: writeFileSync(TOKEN_FILE_PATH, JSON.stringify(tokenData, null, 2), 'utf8')); get-tasks (line 64: writeFileSync(TOKEN_FILE_PATH, JSON.stringify(tokenData, null, 2), 'utf8')); get-checklist-items (line 64: writeFileSync(TOKEN_FILE_PATH, JSON.stringify(tokenData, null, 2), 'utf8'))
⚠️
Known vulnerabilities in dependencies: 3 high
Affects packages this MCP installs at runtime. Upgrade or remove the affected dependency.
🔐
You'll be asked for 3 credentials: CLIENT_SECRET, MSTODO_ACCESS_TOKEN, MSTODO_REFRESH_TOKEN
These are read from process.env at runtime. Make sure you trust where they’ll be sent.
// known CVEs in dependencies3 high5 low

Disclosed vulnerabilities in this server's declared npm dependencies (via OSV). Whether each is reachable depends on the installed versions.

high@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.7.0GHSA-8r9q-7v3j-jr4g

Anthropic's MCP TypeScript SDK has a ReDoS vulnerability

high@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.7.0GHSA-w48q-cv73-mx4w

Model Context Protocol (MCP) TypeScript SDK does not enable DNS rebinding protection by default

highpath-to-regexp@8.2.0GHSA-j3q9-mxjg-w52f

path-to-regexp vulnerable to Denial of Service via sequential optional groups

lowbody-parser@2.1.0GHSA-v422-hmwv-36x6

body-parser vulnerable to denial of service when invalid limit value silently disables size enforcement

lowpath-to-regexp@8.2.0GHSA-27v5-c462-wpq7

path-to-regexp vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service via multiple wildcards

Depend on this server? Get alerted when its CVEs change.Watch this server free →
// environment variables
To run this server yourself, you supply these values. They go in your own MCP client configuration and stay on your machine. The secret label means the value is sensitive, not that the server mishandles it.
configCLIENT_IDyour_client_id
🔐 secretCLIENT_SECRETyour_client_secret
🔐 secretMSTODO_ACCESS_TOKEN
🔐 secretMSTODO_REFRESH_TOKEN
configMSTODO_TOKEN_FILE
configREDIRECT_URI
configTENANT_IDyour_tenant_setting
// quality suggestions

Tool annotations

No tools have read-only/destructive annotations

Add readOnlyHint or destructiveHint annotations to every tool so hosts can warn users before invoking.

All four hints declared on every tool

13/13 tools missing one or more hints — auth-status (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); get-task-lists (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); create-task-list (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint), +10 more. OpenAI's directory rejects tools where any of the four hints are missing or non-boolean.

For every tool, set all four hints (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint) to explicit true/false values that match the handler’s actual behaviour.

Descriptions match behaviour

3 tools describe read intent but their handlers mutate — get-task-lists (line 64: writeFileSync(TOKEN_FILE_PATH, JSON.stringify(tokenData, null, 2), 'utf8')); get-tasks (line 64: writeFileSync(TOKEN_FILE_PATH, JSON.stringify(tokenData, null, 2), 'utf8')); get-checklist-items (line 64: writeFileSync(TOKEN_FILE_PATH, JSON.stringify(tokenData, null, 2), 'utf8'))

Rename the tool, rewrite the description, or move the side-effect into a separate clearly-named tool.

Tool inputs are validated

11/13 tool handlers declare input schemas (85%)

Declare an inputSchema with zod/joi/yup on every tool definition.

License file

No license file

Add a LICENSE file (MIT, Apache-2.0, etc.).

Tests exist

No test files found

Add tests that exercise each declared tool.

Secrets stay with their owner

1 secret/sensitive value flow into network calls (CLIENT_SECRET → dynamic)

Audit where credentials are sent. A NOTION_TOKEN should only reach api.notion.com — never a third-party host.

Secrets not written to files

2 secret values written to files

Avoid persisting secrets to disk. Keep them in memory or your secret manager.

Secrets not logged

15 secret values sent to console.log

Redact or omit secret values from log output.

Production dependencies are patched

0 critical, 3 high severity in production deps — @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.7.0 (high), @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.7.0 (high)

Run npm audit fix, or upgrade the affected packages to a non-vulnerable version.

Dependency freshness

17/82 production deps abandoned (no release in 2+ years): depd@2022-06-15 (4.2y), ee-first@2022-06-16 (4.2y), safer-buffer@2022-05-16 (4.2y)

Tool description accuracy

3 tools have description/behavior mismatches: get-task-lists: description implies read-only but handler writes/deletes/executes; get-tasks: description implies read-only but handler writes/deletes/executes; get-checklist-items: description implies read-only but handler writes/deletes/executes

Update tool descriptions to accurately reflect all capabilities — especially write, delete, or execute operations.

Claim the listing to review these findings one by one and send us a correction where you disagree, straight to the team. Claiming also means we tell you when the grade moves, and reach you first if we find anything urgent.

// full audit trail
The findings above are the summary. The full trail, every check we ran, each deduction, the network hosts observed and the dependency advisories, goes to verified publishers, along with an alert whenever a new one lands. Verified publishers can also review each finding and dispute it in one click. Publisher corrections have sharpened several of our checks this month, because the maintainer knows the codebase better than any scanner.
// improvement guidance — verified publishers only
We have 11 concrete improvements we can share with the publisher of this MCP. Each comes with specific guidance to raise the trust score.
// embed badge in your README
[![M8ven Verified](https://m8ven.ai/badge/mcp/jhirono-todomcp-bar467?variant=verified)](https://m8ven.ai/mcp/jhirono-todomcp-bar467)
Shows verification status without the grade. Want the grade badge instead? Remove ?variant=verified from the URL.
commit: 94a42444d66d93929ca1c7087cbcadedc20bdb1e
code hash: 669270185e365f8c49102deb0523bf70ffc407723ebb36d2f000faafe39669c1
verified: 8/13/2026, 9:02:17 PM
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