F
Warning
38/100
12 hours ago

Unlimited Agent

MCP server that lets a private ChatGPT app remotely control a paired Windows PC, including files, PowerShell, programs, screenshots, mouse/keyboard, clipboard, and Chrome.

Warning. Serious findings were identified. Review the full report before connecting. Grades reflect the full trust pyramid: code, verification depth, and reputation. New projects cap at C until adoption is earned.

How we verified

⚡ Live Monitored: not connected

Verified is a snapshot. Live keeps it current, and builds your track record.

⚡ Connect GitHub → continuous verification on every pushwhy connect →

Who stands behind it

gunwoo55

Source: Glama

Is this your MCP?

Claim it to get a verified publisher badge, a free copy of our full audit findings, and direct contact for any high-priority issues we find. Or connect your repo for our deepest verification, Live Monitored: read-only, revoke anytime. What we access →

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// key findings
⚠️
Tool annotations don’t match behaviour
4 read-only tools perform write/delete/exec — search_files (line 132: spawn(command, args, {); screenshot (line 132: spawn(command, args, {); list_windows (line 132: spawn(command, args, {)
⚠️
Tool descriptions don’t match what handlers do
2 tools describe read intent but their handlers mutate — search_files (line 132: spawn(command, args, {); list_windows (line 132: spawn(command, args, {)
No credential exfiltration, no sensitive file access, no obfuscation
Static analysis found nothing flowing your secrets to unexpected places.
Open source with a license and README
Anyone can audit the code, the license is declared, and the publisher documents what it does.
// environment variables
To run this server yourself, you supply these values. They go in your own MCP client configuration and stay on your machine. The secret label means the value is sensitive, not that the server mishandles it.
configUNLIMITED_AGENT_CONFIG
configUNLIMITED_AGENT_DATA_DIR
configUNLIMITED_AGENT_TEST_APPROVAL
// quality suggestions

Tool annotations match behaviour

4 read-only tools perform write/delete/exec — search_files (line 132: spawn(command, args, {); screenshot (line 132: spawn(command, args, {); list_windows (line 132: spawn(command, args, {)

Either remove the readOnlyHint:true annotation, or remove the write/delete call from the tool handler.

Destructive tools are labelled

1 tool perform destructive updates without destructiveHint — screenshot deletes at line 639 (fs.rm(outputPath, { force: true }))

Add destructiveHint:true to any tool whose handler calls .delete(), .upsert(), .update(), unlink, rm, DELETE, DROP, REPLACE INTO, or any operation that overwrites existing data.

Descriptions match behaviour

2 tools describe read intent but their handlers mutate — search_files (line 132: spawn(command, args, {); list_windows (line 132: spawn(command, args, {)

Rename the tool, rewrite the description, or move the side-effect into a separate clearly-named tool.

Tool inputs are validated

20/21 tool handlers declare input schemas (95%)

Declare an inputSchema with zod/joi/yup on every tool definition.

Shell command execution

6 child_process/subprocess calls in production code — runs shell commands (server.mjs:132, server.mjs:735, server.mjs:764)

Prefer library functions over shell-outs. If you must shell out, ensure all inputs are properly escaped.

Tool description accuracy

3 tools have description/behavior mismatches: search_files: description implies read-only but handler writes/deletes/executes; screenshot: description implies read-only but handler writes/deletes/executes; list_windows: description implies read-only but handler writes/deletes/executes

Update tool descriptions to accurately reflect all capabilities — especially write, delete, or execute operations.

Claim the listing to review these findings one by one and send us a correction where you disagree, straight to the team. Claiming also means we tell you when the grade moves, and reach you first if we find anything urgent.

// full audit trail
The findings above are the summary. The full trail, every check we ran, each deduction, the network hosts observed and the dependency advisories, goes to verified publishers, along with an alert whenever a new one lands. Verified publishers can also review each finding and dispute it in one click. Publisher corrections have sharpened several of our checks this month, because the maintainer knows the codebase better than any scanner.
// improvement guidance — verified publishers only
We have 6 concrete improvements we can share with the publisher of this MCP. Each comes with specific guidance to raise the trust score.
// embed badge in your README
[![M8ven Verified](https://m8ven.ai/badge/mcp/gunwoo55-unlimited-agent-1z05uy?variant=verified)](https://m8ven.ai/mcp/gunwoo55-unlimited-agent-1z05uy)
Shows verification status without the grade. Want the grade badge instead? Remove ?variant=verified from the URL.
commit: 44c350c7c94963006c6f9d48d8e730e8626f9f7b
code hash: ae2b6184a8aa79caa930f1272b58bfcb0c9f5a0d808ce842cc0c67046984e2c6
verified: 8/19/2026, 9:35:35 AM
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