Defense MCP (bottobot/defense-mcp-server) is an MCP server listed on the M8ven Trust Index. M8ven graded this before, but the code is no longer public at the location we read it, so we cannot re-check it. No publisher has claimed this listing.
This is a Linux OS hardening tool. Take a fresh install and immediately harden the heck out of it using just your favourite LLM agent and natural language prompts. "Make my system secure" or "Do a full security audit of my system."
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Install from
The grade above is for the source repository. Registries can serve a different version, so we mark the ones we were not able to read.
These names and descriptions are the publisher's own, read from the source code. We print them as written. Our assessment is the findings above, not this list.
access_controlAccess control: SSH, PAM, sudo, user audit, password policy, shell restriction
api_securityAPI security: local API discovery, auth audit, rate limiting, TLS verify, CORS check
app_hardenApp hardening: audit running apps, recommendations, firewall rules, systemd sandboxing
backupBackup: config files, system state snapshots, restore, verify integrity, list backups
cloud_securityCloud: environment detection, metadata audit, IAM credentials, storage audit, IMDS security
complianceCompliance: Lynis, OpenSCAP, CIS benchmarks, framework checks, policy, cron/tmp hardening
container_dockerDocker security: audit, CIS bench, seccomp, daemon config, image scan
container_isolationContainer isolation: AppArmor, SELinux, namespaces, seccomp, rootless setup
honeypot_manageDeception: canary tokens, honeyport listeners, trigger detection, canary management
dns_securityDNS: resolver audit, DNSSEC check, tunneling detection, domain blocklists, query log audit
ebpfeBPF/Falco: list eBPF programs, Falco status, deploy rules, read events
cryptoCrypto: TLS/SSL audit, GPG, LUKS, file hashing, certificate lifecycle
firewallFirewall: iptables, UFW, nftables, persistence, policy audit
harden_kernelKernel hardening: sysctl, kernel security, bootloader, memory protections
harden_hostHost hardening: services, permissions, systemd, cron, umask, banners, USB control
incident_responseIncident response: volatile data, IOC scan, timeline, forensics (memory/disk/network/evidence/custody)
integrityIntegrity: AIDE, rootkit scanning, file hashing, drift baselines
log_managementLogging: auditd, journalctl, fail2ban, syslog, log rotation, SIEM integration
malwareMalware: ClamAV scan/update, YARA rules, suspicious files, webshells, quarantine
defense_mgmtDefense: tool checks, workflows, change history, posture, scheduled audits, remediation, reports
network_defenseNetwork: connections, traffic capture, port scan detection, IPv6 audit, self-scan, segmentation
patchPatches: pending updates, unattended upgrades, package integrity, kernel audit, CVE lookup
process_securityProcesses: audit running, capabilities, namespaces, anomaly detection, cgroup limits
secretsSecrets: filesystem scan, env variable audit, SSH key sprawl, git history leak detection
sudo_sessionSudo: elevate privileges, check/drop/extend session, preflight tool checks
supply_chainSupply chain: SBOM generation, cosign artifact signing, SLSA provenance verification
threat_intelThreat intel: IP/hash/domain reputation, feed management, blocklist application
vuln_manageVulnerabilities: nmap scan, nikto web scan, tracking, risk prioritization, remediation plans
waf_manageWAF: ModSecurity audit, rule management, rate limiting, OWASP CRS, blocked request analysis
wireless_securityWireless: Bluetooth audit, WiFi assessment, rogue AP detection, disable unused interfaces
zero_trustZero-trust: WireGuard VPN, peer management, mTLS certificates, microsegmentation
my_custom_toolfirewall_iptablestest_toollog_auditdsingle_argDisclosed vulnerabilities in this server's declared npm dependencies (via OSV). Whether each is reachable depends on the installed versions.
When Vitest UI server is listening, arbitrary file can be read and executed
DEFENSE_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS"": "/tmp,/home,/var/log"DEFENSE_MCP_ALLOWED_TOOLSDEFENSE_MCP_AUTO_INSTALLfalse node build/index.jsDEFENSE_MCP_BACKUP_DIRDEFENSE_MCP_BACKUP_ENABLEDtrue Auto-backup before system changesDEFENSE_MCP_CHANGELOG_PATHDEFENSE_MCP_COMMAND_TIMEOUTDEFENSE_MCP_DRY_RUN"": "true",DEFENSE_MCP_LOG_FILEDEFENSE_MCP_LOG_LEVELinfo Log verbosity (debug/info/warn/error)DEFENSE_MCP_LOG_MAX_FILESDEFENSE_MCP_LOG_MAX_SIZEDEFENSE_MCP_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZEDEFENSE_MCP_NETWORK_TIMEOUTDEFENSE_MCP_POLICY_DIRDEFENSE_MCP_PREFLIGHTtrue Enable pre-flight dependency checksDEFENSE_MCP_PREFLIGHT_BANNERStrue Show pre-flight status in tool outputDEFENSE_MCP_PROTECTED_PATHSDEFENSE_MCP_QUARANTINE_DIRDEFENSE_MCP_RATE_LIMIT_GLOBALDEFENSE_MCP_RATE_LIMIT_PER_TOOLDEFENSE_MCP_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOWDEFENSE_MCP_READ_ONLYDEFENSE_MCP_REDACT_OUTPUTDEFENSE_MCP_REQUIRE_CONFIRMATIONtrue Require confirmation for destructive actionsDEFENSE_MCP_RUNTIME_PATH_VERIFYDEFENSE_MCP_SUDO_TIMEOUTDEFENSE_MCP_THIRD_PARTY_INSTALLRequires explicit =true to enableDEFENSE_MCP_TIMEOUT_DEFAULTDEFENSE_MCP_TIMEOUT_LYNISDEFENSE_MCP_TIMEOUT_NMAPDISPLAYLOGNAMEMCP_API_KEYMCP_PORT3100 HTTP server port (when MCP_TRANSPORT=http)MCP_TRANSPORTstdio Transport mode: stdio or httpSSH_CONNECTIONSSH_TTYSUDO_ASKPASSWAYLAND_DISPLAYTool annotations
No tools have read-only/destructive annotations
Add readOnlyHint or destructiveHint annotations to every tool so hosts can warn users before invoking.
All four hints declared on every tool
40/40 tools missing one or more hints — access_control (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); api_security (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); app_harden (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint), +37 more. OpenAI's directory rejects tools where any of the four hints are missing or non-boolean.
For every tool, set all four hints (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint) to explicit true/false values that match the handler’s actual behaviour.
Destructive tools are labelled
4 tools perform destructive updates without destructiveHint — access_control deletes at line 1943 (unlinkSync(tempPath)); honeypot_manage deletes at line 572 (rmSync(canary.path, { recursive: true, force: true })); malware deletes at line 563 (fs.rmdirSync(restoreDir))
Add destructiveHint:true to any tool whose handler calls .delete(), .upsert(), .update(), unlink, rm, DELETE, DROP, REPLACE INTO, or any operation that overwrites existing data.
Descriptions match behaviour
2 tools describe read intent but their handlers mutate — dns_security (line 203: dnsQueryRe.exec(line)); sudo_session (line 909: fs.writeFileSync(scriptPath, scriptLines.join("\n") + "\n", { mode: 0o700 }))
Rename the tool, rewrite the description, or move the side-effect into a separate clearly-named tool.
Tool inputs are validated
19/31 tool handlers declare input schemas (61%)
Declare an inputSchema with zod/joi/yup on every tool definition.
Tool test coverage
12/40 tools referenced in tests (30%)
Write tests that reference each tool by name so every tool has at least one test.
Shell command execution
17 child_process calls — runs shell commands
Prefer library functions over shell-outs. If you must shell out, ensure all inputs are properly escaped.
Dev dependencies
1 critical/high in dev-only deps (does not ship to users)
Upgrade dev dependencies when convenient.
Tool description accuracy
3 tools have description/behavior mismatches: dns_security: description implies read-only but handler writes/deletes/executes; ebpf: description implies read-only but handler writes/deletes/executes; sudo_session: description implies read-only but handler writes/deletes/executes
Update tool descriptions to accurately reflect all capabilities — especially write, delete, or execute operations.
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