filesystem-mcp (1999AZZAR/filesystem-mcp) is an MCP server listed on the M8ven Trust Index. It scores 64 out of 100, grade C. It declares 16 tools. No publisher has claimed this listing.

Back to MCP Trust IndexM8ven
C
Caution
64/100

filesystem-mcp

A comprehensive Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for advanced file system operations. This server provides structured file management capabilities including file operations, directory management, file watching, search functionality, and archiving operations.

→ 1999AZZAR/filesystem-mcp· listed on github_repo_search

Caution. Specific findings reduced this grade. They are listed on the page. Grades reflect the full trust pyramid: code, verification depth, and reputation. New projects cap at C until adoption is earned.

How we verified

⚡ Live Monitored: not connected

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Who stands behind it

1999AZZAR

Source: github_repo_search

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Install from

GitHub

The grade above is for the source repository. Registries can serve a different version, so we mark the ones we were not able to read.

// key findings
⚠️
Known vulnerabilities in dependencies: 3 high
Affects packages this MCP installs at runtime. Upgrade or remove the affected dependency.
✅
No credential exfiltration, no sensitive file access, no obfuscation
Static analysis found nothing flowing your secrets to unexpected places.
✅
Open source with a license and README
Anyone can audit the code, the license is declared, and the publisher documents what it does.
// tools this server exposes16 tools

These names and descriptions are the publisher's own, read from the source code. We print them as written. Our assessment is the findings above, not this list.

read_file

Read file content with optional encoding and range

write_file

Write content to file with optional encoding and directory creation

copy_file

Copy file from source to destination

move_file

Move file from source to destination

delete_file

Delete file or directory

get_file_info

Get detailed file information including metadata

create_directory

Create directory with optional recursive creation

list_directory

List directory contents with optional filtering and recursion

find_files

Find files matching a pattern

search_in_files

Search for text patterns in files

watch_file

Watch file or directory for changes

stop_watching

Stop watching a file or directory

compare_files

Compare two files and show differences

archive_files

Create archive from files

extract_archive

Extract archive to destination

get_directory_size

Get directory size recursively

// known CVEs in dependencies3 high

Disclosed vulnerabilities in this server's declared npm dependencies (via OSV). Whether each is reachable depends on the installed versions.

high@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.18.0GHSA-345p-7cg4-v4c7

@modelcontextprotocol/sdk has cross-client data leak via shared server/transport instance reuse

high@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.18.0GHSA-8r9q-7v3j-jr4g

Anthropic's MCP TypeScript SDK has a ReDoS vulnerability

high@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.18.0GHSA-w48q-cv73-mx4w

Model Context Protocol (MCP) TypeScript SDK does not enable DNS rebinding protection by default

Depend on this server? Get alerted when its CVEs change.Watch this server free →
// environment variables
To run this server yourself, you supply these values. They go in your own MCP client configuration and stay on your machine. The secret label means the value is sensitive, not that the server mishandles it.
configALLOWED_ROOTSColon-separated workspace roots; when set, every path argument is canonicalized (symlink-aware, including non-existent tails) and tools outside the roots are denied. Logged to stderr on startup either way.
configHELA_ALLOWED_ROOTSColon-separated workspace roots; when set, every path argument is canonicalized (symlink-aware, including non-existent tails) and tools outside the roots are denied. Logged to stderr on startup either way.
configHELA_ENVELOPESet to true to wrap tool results in the canonical HeLaResult envelope (ok/summary/data/artifacts/provenance/warnings/sideEffects/execution; mutating tools also report sideEffects). Off = byte-identical legacy output.
configHELA_RUN_ID
configHELA_STEP_ID
configHOST
configMCP_TRANSPORT
Deployment configuration, supplied by whoever hosts the server. Users are not asked for these.
deployPORT
// quality suggestions

Tool annotations

No tools have read-only/destructive annotations

Add readOnlyHint or destructiveHint annotations to every tool so hosts can warn users before invoking.

All four hints declared on every tool

16/16 tools missing one or more hints — read_file (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); write_file (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); copy_file (missing: readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint), +13 more. OpenAI's directory rejects tools where any of the four hints are missing or non-boolean.

For every tool, set all four hints (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint) to explicit true/false values that match the handler’s actual behaviour.

Production dependencies are patched

0 critical, 3 high severity in production deps — @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.18.0 (high), @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.18.0 (high)

Run npm audit fix, or upgrade the affected packages to a non-vulnerable version.

Claim the listing to review these findings one by one and send us a correction where you disagree, straight to the team. Claiming also means we tell you when the grade moves, and reach you first if we find anything urgent.

// full audit trail
The findings above are the summary. The full trail, every check we ran, each deduction, the network hosts observed and the dependency advisories, goes to verified publishers, along with an alert whenever a new one lands. Verified publishers can also review each finding and dispute it in one click. Publisher corrections have sharpened several of our checks this month, because the maintainer knows the codebase better than any scanner.
// improvement guidance — verified publishers only
We have 3 concrete improvements we can share with the publisher of this MCP. Each comes with specific guidance to raise the trust score.
// embed badge in your README
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commit: 4dfd39894af8caa019b7f1d9b581e36db0d9fc77
code hash: 32124f27f770878d247ccafc72ceae90fdefd39f7349a3e5ce16af766477ed58
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